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Living with multimorbidity? The lived experience of multiple chronic conditions in later life 
Abstract 
Multimorbidity is defined biomedically as the co-existence of two or more long-term conditions in an 
individual. Globally the number of people living with multiple conditions is increasing, posing stark 
challenges both to the clinical management of patients and the organisation of health systems. 
Qualitative literature has begun to address how concurrency affects the self-management of chronic 
conditions, and the concept of illness prioritisation predominates. In this paper, we adopt a 
phenomenological lens to show how older people with multiple conditions experience illness. This 
UK study was qualitative and longitudinal in design. Sampling was purposive and drew upon an 
existing cohort study. In total 15 older people living with multiple conditions took part in 27 in-depth 
interviews. The practical stages of analysis were guided by Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz 
2006). We argue that the concept of multimorbidity as clinically imagined has limited relevance to 
lived experience, whilst concurrency may also be erroneous. In response, we outline a lived-
experience of multiple chronic conditions in later life, which highlights differences between clinical 
and lay assumptions and makes the latter visible.  
Abstract: 177 words 
 
Main text: 7998 words 
Multimorbidity represents a fundamental challenge to established modes of health organisation and 
care. This paper addresses the lived experience of multiple chronic conditions and details how this 
perspective diverges from the biomedical conception of multimorbidity. The phenomenologically 
informed outline of multiple conditions we present provides a model to counterpoise the clinical 
conception of multimorbidity wherever it prevails.  
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Background  
Multimorbidity is defined biomedically as the ‘co-existence of two or more long-term conditions in 
an individual’ (Mercer et al., 2009). Epidemiological research estimates the prevalence of 
multimorbidity among older people to be as high as 66.2% (Glynn et al., 2011) and in primary care 
multiple diagnoses are said to be the rule rather than the exception (Fortin et al., 2005). 
Multimorbidity is a global health challenge not limited to high income countries (Afshar et al., 2017). 
Clinical research has shown that having multiple conditions is associated with adverse individual 
outcomes, including increased mortality rates (Wei and Mukamal, 2017), poorer health related 
quality of life (Tyack et al. 2018) and reduced physical functioning (Ryan et al., 2015). Health 
economic research has also shown that multimorbidity results in higher costs across health and 
social care (Wang et al. 2017). 
Alongside epidemiological and economic research, a burgeoning qualitative literature now addresses 
the lived experience of multiple conditions with a focus on self-management. A significant early 
contribution made by Bayliss et al. (2003) reported that a single ‘dominant condition’ often impedes 
the self-care of other conditions (Bayliss et al., 2003: 19), yet this same study was unable to discern 
any pattern according to which conditions predominate. Subsequent qualitative studies have sought 
to identify the seemingly elusive patterning of ‘illness prioritisation’ within multimorbidity. Some 
present illness prioritisation as a ‘strategic choice’ whereby ill people marshal resources towards the 
self-care of particular conditions. Multimorbidity, it is suggested, involves ‘prioritising a main health 
condition’, which demands that people ‘choose to respond to one health condition over another’ 
(White, Lentin and Farnworth, 2016: 94). Factors affecting such choices include perceptions of 
condition severity (Schoenberg et al. 2009), the efficacy of medication and the risk of associated 
diseases (Elliot et al. 2007). However, further studies report that people living with the same 
combination of conditions often understand illness in different ways (Lindsay 2009; Mc Sharry et al. 
2013) seemingly confounding the idea that multimorbidity can be reduced to a set of distinguishable 
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disease entities. Morris et al. (2011) present prioritisation as a dynamic, yet deliberative process, 
wherein the priorities of people living with multiple conditions shift according to the ‘timing 
between diagnoses, prior experiences, recommended self-management activities, bereavement, 
contact with health services and flare-up of conditions’ (Morris et al., 2011: 153). Cheraghi-Sohi et al. 
(2013) argue that social context, clinical interactions, and the ability to control symptoms also shape 
the way lay people prioritise different conditions and symptoms. Others suggest that this complexity 
means self-management is unrealistic for people with multiple conditions and that alternative 
palliative models are more appropriate (Francis, Carryer and Wilkinson 2018).   
A small number of qualitative studies question key epistemic assumptions in clinical, epidemiological 
and health economic readings of illness. Accordingly, self-management only partially explains the 
lived experience of multiple conditions, which is defined in large part by the efforts to preserve 
selfhood (Townsend et al. 2006) and morally valued bodies (Hurd Clarke and Bennett 2012). Pickard 
and Rogers (2012) further critique the epistemological basis of self-management, arguing instead for 
the recognition of embodied knowledge – a form of lay knowledge at odds with the ‘abstract, 
rational model of patient knowledge assumed in programmes like the EPP [Expert Patient 
Programme] ’ (Pickard and Rogers, 2012: 16). These studies sit within a broader sociological 
tradition, which challenges biomedical readings of the body and behaviour (Cohn 2014), and point 
instead to role of embodied, biographical and social factors in framing the meaning of illness 
(Williams 2000).    
Qualitative meta-syntheses of multimorbidity research reflect, and reinforce, the broader corpus. 
Bratzke et al. (2015) state that multimorbidity is marked by ‘competing demands’ and that people 
with multiple chronic conditions ‘select and order their self-management behaviours’, managing one 
disease at the expense of others (Bratzke et al. 2015: 753). Another synthesis depicts multimorbidity 
as a ‘state of complexity’ wherein conditions are ‘strategically self-managed by marshalling medical 
and behavioural resources to preserve self-identity’ (Coventry et al. 2015: 8). However, recent 
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quantitative research has shown that people living with multiple conditions identify different 
conditions as burdensome, suggesting that the relationship between medical diagnoses and illness 
experience is complex (Slightam et al. 2018).  
The purpose of this study was to understand how older people living with multiple chronic 
conditions make sense of illness. Our aim is to provide a foundational reading of multiple chronic 
conditions, beginning with the premise that medical diagnoses do not a priori determine illness. This 
argument extends from immediate embodied experience to include the social and cultural schemes 
through which illness gains meaning. Our findings hold implications for the conceptualisation of 
multimorbidity and thus for healthcare organisation, delivery and education where the concept 
prevails.   
Theoretical perspective 
We begin by recognising the primacy of embodiment and adopt a lived body perspective. This 
perspective derives from phenomenological readings of the body, juxtaposed to archetypal 
biomedical images of the body as mechanistic and amenable to observation, intervention and 
control. Prototypically outlined by Merleau-Ponty, the lived body perspective understands the body 
not simply as a thing-in-the-world, but as the ‘medium for having a world’ (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 
169). The body is a medium in our sense-making practices because, unlike inanimate objects, it is 
intentional and directed towards an experiencing world. Through this intentionality both the body, 
and the world, become meaningful. As Leder states: ‘we cannot understand the meaning and form 
of objects without reference to the bodily powers through which we engage them – our senses, 
motility, language, desires. The lived body is not just one thing in the world, but a way in which the 
world comes to be’ (Leder 1990: 123).  
A second tenet of our analysis is that the body, in the absence of illness, is characterised by 
effacement. Leder (1990) outlines a phenomenology of the ‘normal’ body as characterised by three 
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forms of bodily disappearance: focal disappearance whereby organs disappear from perception 
when they form the focal origin of our perceptual field, background disappearance whereby bodily 
regions disappear into a general ‘corporal gestalt’ (Leder 1990: 26), and depth disappearance 
whereby visceral organs and vital functions recede from awareness because they do not directly 
perceive or act upon the world (Leder 1990: 53). When we become ill or experience pain, our 
perceptual schemes transform, and that which was once invisible becomes visible; bodies become 
‘opaque’ as they enter into subjectivity as an alien presence (Leder 1990: 82). The body and its 
visceral processes become apparent through their dysfunction, a shift Leder coins dys-appearance. 
Once apparent, pain and illness make a twofold ‘telic demand’ upon the subject for hermeneutic and 
pragmatic action (Leder 1990; 78). Hermeneutic action calls for the subject to make sense of 
impairment, whilst the pragmatic moment compels control over the body. These demands open the 
lived body onto myriad socio-cultural schemes of meaning, as well as social and material 
opportunities and constraints for action. It is acted upon through intersubjective and material 
interactions, and is interpreted through cultural schemes inscribed by relations of power – the body 
becomes gendered (Young 1980), racialized (Lee 2014), aged (Gilleard and Higgs 2014) and 
oppressed (Hughes and Paterson 1997). Embodiment thus conceived involves a subject-object 
dialectic whereby the body is simultaneously perceiver and perceived, and neither the body, nor the 
world it inhabits, may be understood without this relation.   
This paper adopts a lived body perspective to delineate lived experiences of multiple conditions, and 
to highlight interactional and interpretive schemes that give meaning to the dys-apprearing body.  
Methods and data collection 
The data presented in this paper are taken from the lead author’s UK based doctoral research. 
Ethical approval was attained from the regional National Health Service Research Ethics Committee.  
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Principal study participants (those with multiple conditions) were purposively sampled and recruited 
from an existing cohort study, the XX study (XX). The XX study sample contained older adults with 
clinical diagnoses of osteoarthritis (OA) and cardiovascular disease (CVD), including hypertension, 
heart disease, and heart failure. The current study recruited from a subgroup of XX participants who 
consented to further contact. These participants had a historic diagnosis of OA and CVD, however all 
reported additional chronic and episodic conditions during interviews (outlined in Table 1). 
Participants were invited to participate by post and responded using pre-paid forms. Four participant 
spouses (secondary study participants) were recruited to provide data on social support (a distinct 
theme within the doctoral research) but this data does not feature in the current paper.  
Principal participants took part in up to two in-depth qualitative interviews spaced three to six 
months apart. This design allowed for greater rapport between participant and interviewer, whilst 
also allowing for longitudinal changes in participants’ circumstances to be recorded. Interviews were 
conducted by the lead author (between 2013 and 2014) in participant’s homes and followed a topic 
guide that was iteratively refined throughout data collection. The data generated were in-depth and 
the each interview typically covered each participant’s history of illness, the meaning of illness and 
the body.Prior to interviews, participants were given study information sheets in accessible formats. 
All participants provided informed consent prior to interviews and this was reaffirmed after each 
interview.  Interviews were transcribed verbatim, with all personally identifying information 
removed. Data storage and administration were conducted using QSR Nvivo 10 on password 
protected servers.   
The sample consisted of eight female and seven male participants; three female spouses and one 
male spouse were also recruited. Participants were aged 59-84. Five participants lived alone, ten 
cohabited. Seven participants were single, eight were married. The sample was ethnically and 
culturally homogenous; fourteen participants were white British, one participant was white non-
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British. The employment status of the sample was also homogenous; thirteen participants were 
retired, one worked full-time, one worked part-time.    
The ontological framing of this paper assumes that the experience of one’s body is a combination of 
both sense-data and the interpretation of this data through socio-cultural schemes. Our aim is to 
present an account of the lived body as it is socially produced, rather than to identify essential 
psychological structures. Therefore, whilst we draw upon phenomenological theory in the 
conceptualisation of our data, we do not employ an explicit phenomenological method.  Instead we 
proceed from a more general interpretive standpoint, which recognises the role of the researcher in 
the production of knowledge, and the practical stages data analysis are drawn from Charmaz’s 
(2006) Constructivist Grounded Theory. The first stage of coding was ‘initial coding’ using line-by-line 
coding.  Following initial coding, increasingly directed and conceptually driven ‘focused coding’ was 
undertaken. Focused coding involved identifying and expanding the most theoretically significant 
and frequently occurring codes delivered through initial coding.  A final stage of ‘theoretical coding’ 
addressed categories of codes generated through focused coding In practice, our analysis delivered a 
‘theory’ or conceptualisation with extensive parallels to existing phenomenological literature (Leder 
1990) and it was at the stage of theoretical coding that Leder’s (1990) ‘dys-appearing body’ was 
drawn upon, as a means of bringing coherent form and clarity to our concepts and as a tool to 
‘weave the fractured story back together’ (Glaser 1992: 71).. Coding was conducted by the lead 
author and each coding stage was subject to review by co-authors. This involved independent coding 
of data by co-authors, who then interrogated the codes developed by the lead author.   
The study did not raise any particular ethical concerns, apart from asking participants to discuss 
potentially upsetting topics. These discussions were conducted so that participants retained control; 
the interviewer took care to remind participants they could pause or stop the interview at any time.   
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Findings  
Data show that the clinical definition of multimorbidity – the co-occurrence of two or more chronic 
conditions in an individual – fails to capture the lived experience. Participants questioned the 
significance and meaning of clinically diagnosed conditions, and for some, the label of concurrence 
was erroneous. Participants made sense of illness using clear interpretive schemes, which we term 
lay logics of meaning. These logics pertain to individualised notions of embodied normality, and the 
intersecting motifs of control, biography, ageing, and biomedicine. We first introduce data 
problematizing the biomedical construction of multimorbidity, then show how participants made 
sense of illness and their bodies through different logics of meaning.  
Living with multimorbidity? 
To presume multimorbidity is experienced as the co-occurrence of two or more chronic conditions 
masks two basic assumptions. First, that people understand their health and illness according to 
clinically diagnosed conditions; and second, that these conditions are experienced in a synchronous 
manner.Participant data challenge these assumptions, and show the lived experience of multiple 
conditions to be more complex than a count of clinical diagnoses alone: 
I’ve got the diabetes, I’ve got the blood pressure, I’ve got arthritis in my knees, fair enough, but 
to me I’m not ill. It’s just an inconvenience. It’s like if you break your arm, you’ve got one arm 
in a bloody sling, you’ve only got one arm to work with.  You’re not ill, are you? [Rhetorical]. 
(ID:109.)  
Despite living with a number of clinically diagnosed conditions, this participant rejects the label of 
illness as a characterisation of his experience. Instead, he frames medical complaints as an 
‘inconvenience’ because he understands illness not simply as the presence of disease, but the extent 
to which impairment affects his everyday life. When our interviewer asked this participant to expand 
upon his understanding of illness, he replied in clear terms: 
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If I was ill I’d be in pain… stomach, chest, the bits that matter in the middle . That’s being ill to 
me. You’ve got no control over it… Appendicitis or if you’ve got bloody transplants, that’s being 
ill... [Whereas] If you break your arm, you’re not ill. It’s a bloody inconvenience. It’s like my 
knees, they’re an inconvenience, but it’s something you’ve got to put up with.  (ID: 109.)   
Impairment transforms the meaning of the material environment and thus the body. However in this 
case the transformation is relatively minor, an inconvenience, rather than an experience dominated 
by disability. Our participant has a clear understanding of what it means to be an ‘ill person’. Illness 
means losing control, diseased visceral organs, or complex clinical interventions. In the absence of 
these signs or symptoms, this participant, despite multiple diagnoses, understands his health as the 
practical limitations impairment confers.  
Another participant, a woman living with systemic lupus, OA, depression, and an addiction to opioid 
medication, expressed similar reasoning. This participant was a nurse by profession and recognised 
the importance of multimorbidity to clinical practice. Despite this, when describing her own 
experience of illness, she questioned the relevance of multimorbidity as clinically imagined:  
I don’t look at myself as this ill person with all these things going on. Even on the worst day, it 
was always because it was one particular thing that was the problem at the time.  So anything 
else associated or not associated with that didn’t really come into... if it was arthritis that was 
the problem, then that was the problem.  (ID: 112.)  
This participant questions the label of illness and problematises the synchronous basis of 
concurrency. Concurrency, as is generally imagined within epidemiological literature (Valderas et al. 
2009), assumes the simultaneous presence of multiple conditions. Yet as this participant explains, 
the lived experience of concurrence is characterised by fluctuating symptoms, meaning that a single 
symptom or condition may dominate experience at any one time. Redolent of Leder’s (1990) dys-
appearing body, symptoms and conditions slip in and out of apprehension according to their 
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perception. Thus, we can say that whilst concurrence is a defining feature of multimorbidity as an 
object of biomedical knowledge, concurrence does not define this participant’s experience of 
multiple conditions.  
Several participants made reference to ‘borderline’ conditions when describing their health, and 
where this occurred, the ambiguity between embodied experiences and clinical diagnoses 
problematized concurrence further. The following quotations, both from female participants, are 
exemplary:   
I had a diabetic foot in October and nearly lost my toe; it went black. I’m borderline diabetes; 
I’m not classed as a diabetic. (ID: 101.)   
My blood pressure has fallen again but only, probably just in the zone he [consultant] wanted 
which was… was it 70 over? No 100 over – I can’t remember. Something over 70… he said, 
“Well, it’s borderline”. (ID: 104.)  
The ‘borderline’ status of diabetes and hypertension means these conditions are experienced as 
simultaneously present and absent. Illness is present insofar as both participants have an awareness 
of risk, which may require preventative or remedial action. At the same time the ‘borderline’ status 
denotes illness as absent – as the first participant explains, ‘I’m not classed as a diabetic’. These 
excerpts highlight the importance of inchoate aspects of ill health (Scott et al. 2005) as the latent 
possibility of illness shapes how both women understand their bodies and the meaning of their 
health.   
Other participants spoke about illness in ways that highlight a more general dissonance between 
diagnosed conditions and the lived experience of multimorbidity.  
I have a chest problem which just flares up now and again, but I’ve had that for a lot of years. 
It’s not chronic, but it’s just that sometimes I wheeze quite a lot and other times it’s okay.  I had 
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bronchitis a long time ago.  I had to go to the chest clinic… The  only diagnosis they could come 
up with was bronchitis.  It wasn’t a permanent thing. Even in this warm weather, people would 
say to me, ‘Have you got a bad cold?’  I haven’t, it’s just the rustiness in my throat.  (ID: 111.)  
This participant’s ‘chest problem’ was among her most salient concerns, yet in the absence of a 
clear clinical explanation its meaning remains ambiguous. One explanation may be that her 
‘weakness’ is a sign of chronic bronchitis, but she understands this issue differently. This 
complaint gains significance only when our participant perceives it as a physical impairment, or 
when others recognise it during interactions. Once perceived, lay terminology of ‘weakness’ and 
‘rustiness’ help bring sense to her symptoms.   
Lay logics of meaning 
Lived experience diverges from clinical definition, but lay perspectives are not irrational and 
participants revealed clear interpretive schemes when making sense of illness. Recalling Leder’s 
(1990) ‘twofold telic demand’ for hermeneutic and pragmatic act ion, we outline how the motifs of 
control, biography, ageing and biomedicine relate to participants’ perceptions of, and efforts 
towards, embodied normality.   
Normality and control 
Chronic illness is often marked by a perceptual shift, as life veers from a once ‘normal trajectory’ 
towards one that feels ‘fundamentally abnormal and inwardly damaging’ (Bury 1982: 171). Notions 
of normality, of life before illness, are powerful reference points. Normality may be a goal, a 
yardstick against which progress is measured, or a painful reminder of what has been lost. For 
participants in this study, efforts to ‘carry on as normal’, to maintain social relationships and 
continue in valued activities were common. For many, illness became meaningful as symptoms or 
physical limitations punctured some aspect of normality.  
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It’s there, these things… one, two or three, whatever you’ve got, arthritis, asthma, you’ve just 
got to live with it. It’s there and until I start coughing, you just carry on as normal. Just carrying 
on until you try to do something, getting stuff out of a cupboard or something, then you realise 
that you’ve got that condition. (ID: 102.)  
This excerpt illustrates how individual conceptions of normality act as a foundation upon which 
illness gains meaning. Our participant describes being able to ‘carry on as normal’ despite living with 
multiple conditions, and it is only when some aspect of daily life becomes impeded that illness is 
comprehended. When normality is impinged it is those disrupting features of illness are propelled to 
the foreground of experience. 
Another male participant shed further light on the link between disrupted normality and the 
meaning of multiple conditions: 
I’m living with these aches and pains, as it were, you know?  But quite often, while this 
weather’s been on, I’ve started coughing when I’m in bed and I’ve had to get up. I may have 
gone to bed about 10 or 12 o’clock, and I’ve had to get up because I’m coughing that much… 
The night’s worse with this with asthma, it’s so long if you are coughing during the night…. It’s 
a long time till breakfast. (ID: 103.) 
Our participant says that the ‘aches and pains’ associated with OA are not so onerous as to prevent 
normality, whilst sleepless nights caused by episodes of coughing are more disruptive. This is 
understandable given that sleep is a socially organised practice, which gives meaning and order to 
our social worlds (Williams 2002). The disruption of sleep means the disruption of normal life, of 
typical patterns of interactions and activities. The statement ’It’s a long time till breakfast’ conveys 
the isolation and suffering that mark these experiences, and explains why asthma and cough 
dominate this participant’s experience of illness.  
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Control engenders normality and participants spoke about control as the means of attaining 
embodied normality, as the motivation for self-management activities, and shaping the meaning of 
illness in prospective terms. For many, medication was the primary means of recovering control over 
illness and the body.  
As long as the medication is controlling the blood pressure, I should be fine. As long as I take the 
eye drops – I can’t focus with one eye, I have a problem with one eye, and that’s been the 
situation since I was a child really. I’ve basically only got one good eye. If I was to lose that, then I 
would have serious issues, but I’m told that as long as I continue taking the drops; as long as I 
attend the eye clinic regularly, for them to check the  eye pressures, then hopefully, everything’s 
under control. (ID: 102.)  
This participant’s feelings of control over future complications shape the meaning of hypertension 
and glaucoma. He understands clearly the risks posed by hypertension, whilst his reference to 
having only ‘one good eye’ crystallises the threat of glaucoma. Yet medication has delivered a sense 
of control, and as the perceived risks posed by both conditions abate, so too, in our participant’s 
view, does their significance.  
In another example, a male participant explained that his ability to control diabetes had curtailed the 
significance of this condition. This participant received a diagnosis of type 2 diabetes shortly before 
his first interview, at which point it was a major concern. However, by the time of his follow-up 
interview (4 months later), he spoke impassively about this diagnosis:   
I’m keeping it under control. I think I am, anyway. I’ve got to go back August, for another blood 
test and check-up. If it stays as it is, or comes down again, I shall be quite happy. (ID: 109.)  
Dietary changes and medication have enabled control and allayed the threat posed by this condition 
to health, the body and everyday life. With control, the significance of diabetes diminishes and our 
participant appears untroubled by this diagnoses.  
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The importance of control was underscored where participants spoke of being unable to control 
illness and the body. One participant described his experiences following radical prostatectomy and 
his struggle to come to terms with incontinence:  
I’m 18 months on and I’ve still got a nappy on, which sickens me at times it really does. You’re 
going out and you think, “Bloody hell, I’d better go and have a wash and change that” because 
you think you can smell yourself. It’s not very nice. (ID: 107.)  
This case illustrates clearly the link between control and normality, and shows how a lack of bodily 
control can frustrate efforts to regain normality. Incontinence is experienced as an acute lack of 
control, both physically and emotionally, as shame and embarrassment threaten to undermine this 
participant’s sense of self. Incontinence and its associated stigma anchor this participant’s life in 
illness; 18 months after surgery, his distress at the lack of normality is palpable.   
Biography and normality 
The lens of normality, which confers meaning on illness, is shaped in turn by individual biography. 
Chronic illness may be experienced as a sudden crisis during which biography is disrupted (Bury 
1982) or it may be an anticipated feature of one’s social and temporal milieu (Fairclough et al. 2004). 
Multiple diagnoses were a recent development for some participants, whilst others had lived with 
illness and impairment since childhood. Our data show that the way this multiplicity is understood 
(both as individuated conditions and also as gestalt) varies according to biographical context.   
When asked to describe his overall health, one male participant listed OA, heart disease, and 
hypertension. Prompted to give a fuller picture of his health, this participant proceeded to identify 
another health concern:   
My other main problem would be as a teenager I suffered from osteomyelitis, which meant 
that I was operated on my right ankle. They removed diseased bone. I was in plaster for 12 
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months. And now as I’ve got older it’s turned arthritic. So the ankle … when I exercise it 
stiffens. If I rest it up, when I wake up of a morning, it’s stiff. So, I’m limping around for a good 
couple of hours. (ID: 102.)  
Biographical context frames the meaning of this impairment, its aetiology, and the impact it has 
on this participant’s life. This impairment is not biographically disruptive (although it likely was as 
a teenager) because over many years the limitations it confers have been incorporated into a 
stable sense of embodied selfhood. Our participant regards this aspect of ill-health to be normal: 
‘It’s painful, it’s stiff, it aches, but you learn to live with it’.  Consequently, the significance of this 
painful and limiting impairment is diminished, and when asked ‘on a day-to-day basis, what are 
you most aware of?’ this participant replied ‘the blood pressure, obviously, because I’m taking 
medication on a daily basis’. Pain and stiffness pose little threat to this participant’s embodied 
self because these complaints are a consistent feature of a coherent biography and are not 
considered dysfunctions. In contrast, hypertensive medication acts as a daily reminder and mean 
this condition, whilst asymptomatic, is more readily perceived. 
Another male participant expressed similar reasoning when talking about his congenital foot 
deformity:  
ID: 108: The doctor offered me some painkillers and I said 'No thank you’... I don't want 
something that is another addictive thing.  Every time you have a pain you take a 
painkiller. With my foot, I'm not being funny now, I'm not looking for sympathy, but I 
have pain with it all the time. Not now, but when I start walking, I can only walk so 
far before it aches. But that is nothing to do with my health.  That's just the way it 
was born. 
Int:  So you don't consider that a health problem? 
ID 108: No, because I've had that from birth.    
16 
 
Impairment is so closely enmeshed with this participant’s biography that he does not consider pain 
and functional limitations to be health problems. He rejects the pathological lens, and instead 
regards impairment as a normal bodily state, leading him to eschew medical intervention.   
Age and normality 
Biography and notions of normality are structured by the individual’s position in the life course. The 
‘social clock’ of illness explains how age-related cultural referents shape expectations of health and 
illness within a biographical context (Bury and Holme 1991) and previous studies have shown how 
the ‘social clock’ mediates the meaning to conditions and events such as arthritis and strokes in later 
life (Sanders 2002; Faircloth 2004). In this study of multiple chronic conditions, participants drew on 
the imagery of ageing both at the general level of multiple conditions, and also the specific level of 
symptoms and conditions within that multiplicity. 
At the general level, several participants invoked age when reflecting upon the accumulation of 
multiple health concerns. One male participant said:   
I just think that it’s part of life’s rich tapestry, to be honest with you. That it’s inevitable that 
with age you’re going to have… you’re going have issues.  (ID: 109.)  
This participant understands the accrual of health problems to be a normal part of the ageing 
process. One consequence of this, it is reasonable to assume, is that the multiplicity of conditions 
is in itself unlikely to threaten his sense of self or anticipated future as it might were he younger. 
A female participant expressed similar views when talking about recent reductions in her 
mobility:   
I think that the last 12 months perhaps it has gone, deteriorated a little more. But all I can say 
is that it’s something I have to accept.  Of course, my own body as well, my age doesn’t help 
because you’re obviously not agile anymore.  But as I say, I’m grateful that I am where I am.  
(ID: 111.)  
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At the same time, participants also associated specific conditions with later life:   
I have osteoarthritis in my back, which I take medication for. But I mean, you have it in your 
fingers and that, but that’s a natural thing that comes with your age.  (ID: 111.)  
The association between arthritis and ageing was common (so too was the link between 
hypertension and later life) and we concur with previous studies that recognise the role of culturally 
constituted links between ageing, illness, and physical decline in giving meaning to the experience of 
illness (Sanders 2002; Faircloth 2004). However, whilst participants identified certain conditions as a 
normal feature of later life, other concurrent conditions were not. Cancer, for example, was not 
described as normal, ‘natural’, or an inevitable feature of ageing. We can say, therefore, that the 
‘social clock’ of illness shapes meaning at the general level of accumulated health complaints, but 
varies according to specific conditions within that multiplicity. 
Biomedicine and health professionals  
Biomedicine and interactions with health professionals provide a further interpretive scheme. 
Several participants spoke about risk factors, clinical prognoses, and pathophysiological associations 
when making sense of their health. One male participant drew upon such concepts when explaining 
the meaning of cancer and hypertension:   
Cancer is the one that preys on you, really… because they can sneak back anytime. So as long 
as I can keep that in, I can manage. Because, the other week when I went for my annual check-
up with my GP, my blood pressure was 135/74, which is pretty good. He said everything’s all 
right there, so that’s under control. (ID: 107.)  
This participant deploys basic biomedical knowledge to make sense of illness. He presents cancer 
and hypertension within a hierarchy of risk, in which cancer supersedes hypertension due to the 
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risk of reoccurrence and mortality. Hypertension is also framed biomedically through the 
reporting of blood pressure readings, which appear to afford this participant a sense of control.  
Risk factors were widely referenced by participants, and hypertension in particular became 
meaningful through its association with cardiovascular events. One female participant said that 
hypertension was not ‘on her radar’ because it was controlled by medication. However, when asked 
how she would feel if her blood pressure were to rise, she replied ‘I’d be thinking strokes, heart 
attack’ (ID: 112). Another female participant said: 
I wouldn’t say that I think about it [hypertension], but if you don’t feel well, or sometimes you’ll 
get up and you’ll not feel on top hole, you do think about it, because something that you worry 
about more than anything at this age is strokes.  Of course, with blood pressure, you do think 
about it a bit like that.  (ID: 111.)  
Hypertension seems not to feature in the foreground of this participant’s experience. Yet, when 
some aspect of illness is perceived – not feeling ‘on top hole’ – her knowledge of the association 
between hypertension and stroke means that the significance of hypertension increases.   
Interactions with healthcare professionals also inform the meaning of illness, and several 
participants described influential consultations where symptoms remained unexplained. One male 
participant recalled consulting his GP over breathlessness:  
They checked my heart out and they said it’s not that. Something here [points towards chest], 
but it’s gone no farther, so I’m not bothering them, I’m still going.  They’ll send for me if they 
decide to do anything. (ID: 103.)  
This participant expresses trust in the expertise of his doctor and he accepts their clinical judgement. 
Despite his unexplained symptoms, this participant’s concerns are allayed and breathlessness 
becomes part of his normal embodied state.   
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In rare instances, interactions with healthcare professionals heightened uncertainty and suffering. 
One female participant recalled consulting her GP after weeks of unexplained pain. When asked 
whether her GP had resolved her concerns, she replied:  
Well, half and half really, because I wanted him to diagnose… was it sciatica? But he didn’t 
actually say that, perhaps he didn’t know, because when he put me on the couch and said ‘Can 
you move, put this leg up?’ He said that if I can do that, it isn’t sciatica. So I just thought  ‘Well, 
what is it then?’ Have I pulled a muscle?’ I don’t know. It could be, couldn’t it? But he didn’t 
diagnose anything. (ID: 110.)  
The inability of the clinician to offer a clear diagnosis appears to exacerbate our participant’s suffering 
as her pain assumes greater significance by virtue of its apparent senselessness.  This participant lacks 
an interpretive scheme by which to make sense of pain, and we might regard her experience as one 
of ‘embodied doubt’ (Nettleton 2006) marked by uncertainty and distrust of the body.  
Discussion  
The aim of this study was to understand how older people living with multiple chronic conditions 
make sense of ill health. The small and homegenous sample of this study means that important 
analytic concens (such as gender and race) have not been addresed. Future research should consider 
how such factors affect the lived experience of multiple conditions.  However, our findings 
problematize two assumptions made within clinically informed literature: that multimorbidity is 
defined by delimited diagnosed conditions, and that these conditions are experienced as 
phenomenologically concurrent. Participants in this study questioned the relevance of diagnosed 
conditions, and instead identified colloquial, undiagnosed and inchoate factors as defining features 
of their health. Participants also undermined the relevance of concurrency as biomedically imagined, 
and spoke instead about concurrency as biographically and temporally framed, much as depicted by 
Leder’s (1990) dys-appearing body. Some participants challenged the pathological lens and rejected 
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the label of illness altogether – ‘I’ve got the diabetes, I’ve got the blood pressure, I’ve got arthritis in 
my knees, fair enough, but to me I’m not ill’.  Such cases show how physical impairment and clinical 
diagnoses may be incorporated into reformed visions of embodied normality. This (re)effacement of 
troubled bodies stems from what Leder terms the ‘twofold telic demand’ for hermeneutic and 
pragmatic action (Leder 1990; 78). Faced with illness and impairment, we strive to make sense and 
to accommodate.  
Normality was at the centre of most participant’s accounts, and our data confirm the differentiated 
and relativistic nature of normality (Kelly and Field 1998) as participants drew on individualised and 
contextualised images of what they considered to be ‘normal’.  Control, or the practical efforts to 
monitor and affect the course of illness, was vital to participants’ efforts to maintain, regain or 
reform their desired vision of a normal life. Where control was possible, participants experienced 
bodily effacement as favoured phenomenological states were attainable, whilst a lack of control 
resulted in continued bodily dys-appearance and lived experiences dominated by illness.   
Biography provides a context where notions of normality are formed, disrupted and reformed (Bury 
1982). Our data show that the meaning of the body, impairment and specific conditions vary 
according to this context. Lay interpretations of illness may seem counter intuitive from a clinical 
perspective, as in the case of participant 102 who said that the pain caused by a congenital 
deformity was less salient than hypertension. As discussed by Williams (2000), however, congenital 
conditions and life-long impairments are often consistent with, even integral to, one’s embodied 
sense of self. In such cases, the significance and consequence of these complaints are often 
mitigated.  
The culturally constituted link between ageing, illness, and physical decline was a prominent theme. 
As in previous disease-specific studies, our data show that particular conditions within 
multimorbidity such as arthritis (Sanders et al. 2002), or outcomes such as limited mobility (Grime et 
al. 2010), may be interpreted as an expected feature of later life. Consequently, such diseases, 
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symptoms or outcomes may be accorded less significance than aspects of ill health that are not seen 
as normal, ‘natural’, or an inevitable part of the ageing process.  
Finally, the distinction between clinical and lay schemes of knowledge is not binary, and lay people 
regularly appropriate, adapt and deploy biomedical knowledge within their own sense-making 
practices (McClean and Shaw 2005). Participants drew upon biomedical concepts when making 
sense of illness, and interactions with clinicians also gave meaning to illness. Yet, as our data show, 
the absence of such interpretive schemes, as with undiagnosed symptoms, may just as easily 
exacerbate uncertainty and suffering.   
Multimorbidity understood as ‘the co-existence of two or more long-term conditions in an 
individual’ (Mercer et al., 2009) radically truncates these complex sense-making practices. At best, 
the biomedically informed concept obscures lived experience; at worst, it distorts our understanding 
of the body and subject in line with biomedical presumptions. Our data show that the meaning of 
multimorbidity derives not only from the physical and mental complaints deemed pathological by 
the clinical gaze, but from embodied experience framed biographically and subject to wider cultural 
representations. The clearest priorities of participants in this study were those associated with 
selfhood, such as maintaining roles, relationships, and valued activities (Townsend et al. 2006). 
‘Illness prioritisation’, where it did occur, appeared epiphenomenal to the prioritisation and 
preservation of preferred visions of embodied selfhood through control and normality. These 
findings lead us to question the concept of illness prioritisation, or the ways that people with 
multiple chronic conditions choose to prioritise the self-management of certain conditions over 
others. If we accept that people do not understand their health by reference to delimited diagnosed 
conditions alone, and if concurrence is more complex than biomedically imagined, then prioritisation 
– premised as it is upon the notion of competing, clearly identifiable and disease-specific claims 
(Bratzke et al. 2015) – seems somewhat erroneous.   Further, it seems unlikely that a universal or 
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generalizable ‘lived experience of multimorbidity’ is attainable, nor any systematic pattern of illness 
priorities discernible.  
The clinical concept of multimorbidity is problematic because it imposes biomedical order, and 
implies cognisance, modes of interpretation, and loci for action that are at odds with those of lived 
bodies (Leder 1992). Multimorbidity is an epidemiological fact and a concept of clinical significance. 
However it is a concept that easily leads us to misunderstand the lived experience of people living 
with multiple conditions. The concept itself need not be discarded, but it must be seen as just one 
model in chiasmic relation to that of the lived body: divergent concepts, which nevertheless overlap 
and encroach. Privileging either model curtails our understanding both of the body and the subject, 
and will lead to suboptimal practices of care. The key, we suggest, is to develop systems of health 
care and education around multimorbidity that attend to both physiological and existential needs.  
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Table 1. Principal Participant Details 
ID Sex 
 
Age 
group 
Marital / 
Accommodation 
status 
Self-identified ill-health (in addition to OA and 
CVD) 
101 F 65-74 Single, lives alone Mental health (not specified), asthma, angina, 
reactive arthritis (eye), Raynaud’s phenomenon, 
clawed toe. 
102 M 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Osteomyelitis (as a teenager), asthma, heart 
disease, glaucoma. 
103 M 75+ Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Asthma, COPD, regular chest infections, 
stomach ulcers, ‘collapsed vocal chords’. 
104 
 
 
F 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Rheumatoid arthritis, bunions. 
105 F 75+ Single, lives alone Type II diabetes, ‘underactive thyroid’, 
glaucoma, ‘breathlessness’, ‘fluid retention’, 
bronchitis. 
106 M 75+ Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Asbestosis, stomach ulcers, prostate cancer (14 
years prior), COPD. 
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107 M 65-74 Single, lives alone Heart attack (10 years prior), prostate cancer (2 
years prior). 
108 M 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Heart failure, multiple TIAs, ‘clubbed foot’ 
(congenital), mild cognitive impairment. 
109 M 65-74 Single, cohabits 
with daughter 
Type II diabetes, back pain. 
110 F 65-74 Single, lives alone Depression, anxiety. 
111 F 75+ Single, lives alone Hip surgery complications (pain and mobility). 
‘chest weakness’. 
112 F 55-64 Single, cohabits 
with daughter 
Systematic lupus, depression, addiction (pain 
killers) 
113 F 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Congenital neuromuscular condition (limited 
mobility), ankylosing spondylitis, vertigo. 
114 F 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with spouse 
Fibromyalgia, coeliac disease, diverticulitis. 
115 M 65-74 Married, cohabits 
with son 
Prostate cancer (18 months prior), neck pain. 
 
 
